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Abstract
Video gaming actively demands players’ attention, affording positive experiences like flow. Recent research has suggested
to extend analysis from cognitive and physical to the social and emotional demands of gameplay. This article argues that
Erving Goffman’s concept of interaction tension offers a promising theoretical model for social demands. We report a
re-analysis of qualitative interview data on the social norms of video gaming corroborating the model. As suggested by
Goffman (1961) for gaming, video gaming features rich social norms regarding involvement. When spontaneously experi-
enced and normatively demanded involvement misalign, players experience self-conscious disinvolvement and engage in
unenjoyable, effortful self-control of their experienced and displayed involvement.
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1. Introduction
Gaming, at least the desirable kind, binds our attention:
We call it immersive, absorbing, engaging, or involving
(Cairns, Cox, & Nordin, 2014; Calleja, 2011). But how do
games accomplish that? And why, in the age of the at-
tention economy, do we so gladly part with this ever-
scarcer resource?
Following flow theory, humans enjoy “order in con-
sciousness” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 39), yet con-
sciousness naturally drifts toward disorder: Unmet de-
sires, worries, aversions, and self-consciousness split
and divert our attention (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 37).
Hence, we seek out gaming and other “flow activities”
because their “clearly structured demands…impose or-
der” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 58) and ensure that “at-
tention is completely absorbed” (p. 53). Mood manage-
ment theory similarly argues that people improve their
mood by selecting media with a high intervention poten-
tial, the ability to absorb attention such that none is left
to ruminate on negative thoughts (Reinecke, 2016)—and
games have been found to provide just that (Bowman &
Tamborini, 2015).
1.1. The Demands of Games and Challenging Media
Past applications of flow and mood management the-
ory to games have focused cognitive and physical de-
mands on attention (Sweetser & Wyeth, 2005), like solv-
ing puzzles or fast hand-eye coordination in jump-and-
run games. Bowman’s (2018a) recent “interactivity-as-
demand” perspective suggests to extend this towards a
more general theory. Games and interactivemedia, he ar-
gues, put cognitive and physical, but also emotional and
social demands on users, which mediate their various ex-
periential effects, not just attentive binding. This demand
perspective is currently drawing academic attention, ev-
ident in a topical edited book (Bowman, 2018b) and the
present thematic issue. It strongly overlaps with recent
attempts to re-conceptualize challenge in games and me-
dia. Cole, Cairns, and Gillies (2015) for instance identi-
fied distinct functional versus emotional challenges in
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games,whichmaponto cognitive and emotional demand.
Denisova, Guckelsberger, and Zendle (2017) distinguish
cognitive, physical, and emotional game challenge, which
map one-to-one to cognitive, emotional, and physical de-
mands. Relatedly, eudaimonic media research suggests
that audiences actively seek out “challenging media”
for meaning and personal growth (Bartsch & Hartmann,
2017). Here, challenge is conceptualized as “the extent to
which users perceive they need to apply self-regulatory
resources to control both cognitive and affective pro-
cesses while processing media content” (Eden, Johnson,
& Hartmann, 2018, p. 355).
1.2. Social Demands: From Separable Stimuli to the
Constitutive Sociality of Gaming
Arguably the most novel demand dimension proposed
by Bowman (2018a) are social demands, “the extent to
which a system triggers an implicit or explicit response in
theuser to thepresenceof other social actors.”Under this
heading, he comprises phenomena like social facilitation,
presence, relatedness need satisfaction, but also self-
presentation and social norms and pressures. Bowman,
Wasserman, and Banks (2018) subsequently developed
and validated a video game demand scale, finding a dis-
crete social demand factor comprising six items,which sig-
nificantly correlated with relatedness need satisfaction.
In the same volume, Peña (2018) presented a framework
factoring out different social demands as “any compo-
nent of the communicative process…that has an impact
on the quantity andquality of the social ties of players and
game audiences.” In parallel, Bopp, Opwis, and Mekler
(2018) identified “social challenges” as a subset of ‘con-
ventional’ and emotional challenge in gameplay, compris-
ing social conditions that produce a challenge (e.g., oth-
ers ganging up or difficult team communication), manag-
ing other players’ emotion, and genuine social emotions,
chiefly pride in oneself and anger at others.
Useful as these accounts are, they present more of
a first descriptive classification of related phenomena
than theoretical models identifying distinct mechanisms
that link these phenomena together: The ‘social’ of so-
cial demands variously refers to social antecedents (me-
diated or cued presence of other social actors in Bowman
[2018a], Bowman et al. [2018]; social conditions in Bopp
et al. [2018]) and social consequences (social ties in
Peña [2018]; social emotions in Bopp et al. [2018]; social
gratifications and need satisfaction in Bowman [2018a]).
In addition, Peña (2018) and to some extent Bowman
(2018a) present social demands as analytically separa-
ble from other forms of demand (e.g., Bowman [2018a,
p. 15], “it is plausible that social demands can represent
their ownunique source”). In this, theirmetaphorical use
of the word “demand” strangely elides its literal mean-
ing: “An act of demanding or asking by virtue of right or
authority” (Demand, n.d.). A demand is a communicative
action drawing on a social norm to compel another per-
son to act in a certain way.
Against this stand ethological, anthropological, soci-
ological, and developmental play research (Burghardt,
2005; Henricks, 2015; Pellegrini, 2009) and socio-
material accounts of video gaming (Stenros, 2015; Taylor,
2009) which argue that (video) gaming is always already
social. ‘Gaming’ and ‘games’ are social categories consti-
tuted by shared meanings and actions, just like ‘money’
or ‘marriage.’ We need to be actively socialized into per-
ceiving and realizing the affordances of game hardware
and software (Hung, 2011). Andwhat we do and feel dur-
ing gaming is subject to a rich tapestry of specific norms.
Playing any game requires us to enact these social or-
ders, where ‘gaming’ or ‘Pong’ is a thing, where crossing
this pixel line with that pixel dot is counted as ‘scoring a
point,’ andwhere doing so is an appropriate reason to be
cheerful (Sniderman, 1999). In other words, whatever a
game object ‘demands’ of a player, the object and its de-
mands are always alreadymade out ofmatter asmuch as
social norms, practices, and understandings, whose on-
going reproduction is mutually expected and sanctioned
by the members of our society.
Is there a way to reconcile a demand perspective with
this constitutive sociality of gaming? This article proposes
that sociologist ErvingGoffman’smodel of interaction ten-
sion provides just such a coherent theory of how consti-
tutive social demands impact player experience. In brief,
Goffman (1961) argues that when interacting with others,
states of enjoyment, boredom, or (un)self-consciousness
arise not just from the activity itself, but from the relative
alignment of spontaneous and normatively demanded at-
tentive and emotional involvement. In demand perspec-
tive terms, the social demands of games can be conceptu-
alized as the social norms of ‘proper’ attentive-emotional
involvement in gaming, with ‘norm-fitting’ as a social-
psychological mediator of player experience.
To illustrate the applicability of interaction tension to
video gaming, after introducing the model, we here re-
port a re-analysis of qualitative interviews with German
adult players around social norms for attentive and emo-
tional involvement in video gaming. Our data broadly cor-
roborates but also qualifies Goffman’s model in that mis-
aligned spontaneous and demanded involvement is ex-
perientially characterized by effortful self-control more
than boredom and self-consciousness, and that it can
also be experienced during solitary gaming. We discuss
wider ramifications for the demand perspective on video
gaming as well as flow and mood management theory:
Broadening the focus from game stimuli to social dy-
namics and contexts, including self-control as an impor-
tant mediating process, and working out how social de-
mands systemically structure the attention and emotion
demands of game play.
2. Theory: Interaction Tension
Goffman’s (1983) work centers on the interaction order,
the specific social ordering that obtains when two or
more people can immediately perceive and respond to
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each other’s actions. Such response-present interaction
uniquely affords joint attention, which enables the sym-
bolic and finely coordinated action essential to human
culture (Seeman, 2011).
To guide action and sense-making in response-
present interaction, social groups develop a shared reper-
toire of frames, reoccurring types of situations such as
‘going to the doctor’ or ‘lecture’ (Goffman, 1986). Every
frame entails roles that can (and have to) be taken on by
actors and define what conduct is expected and appro-
priate for each role-taker. During socialization, children
not only internalize frames and roles, but also become
aware of and construct their self from others’ responses,
become emotionally invested in this self, and adopt the
values of their group regarding desirable self traits: They
learn to care about face, “an image of self delineated
in terms of approved social attributes” (Goffman, 1967,
p. 5). Social emotions like pride or embarrassment are
the affective dimension of assessing how relevant others
assess our self (Scheff, 2000; Turner & Stets, 2006). They
motivate us to act properly in response-present interac-
tion, to fulfil role expectations, present a desirable self,
show due regard to the other’s self, and keep interaction
flowing smoothly (Goffman, 1967, pp. 5–112).
By its nature, working response-present interaction
requires mutual involvement. Goffman (1963, p. 36) de-
fines involvement as “cognitive and affective engross-
ment” in an activity. As social animals, we have a natu-
ral propensity to get unselfconsciously involved in joint
attentional foci. Such joint involvement mutually signals
that the focal activity is worth and appropriate to un-
selfconsciously attend to (Goffman, 1967, pp. 113–167).
Strong joint involvement fuels social cohesion and mo-
bilization (Goffman, 1967, p. 113), as seen in e.g., rav-
ing sports fans watching a match together (Hatfield,
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; von Scheve & Salmela, 2014).
Conversely, without joint involvement, response-present
interaction quickly breaks down.
Therefore, as part of frames, social groups develop
norms around “the structure of involvement in the sit-
uation” (Goffman, 1963, p. 193), who may legitimately
open, join, leave, or close what kind of joint focal activity,
and how deeply involved one may and ought to become
in it. For most situations, the “expression of a particu-
lar allocation [of involvement] is obligatory” (Goffman,
1963, p. 37). Even worse, there is an “obligation of spon-
taneous involvement” (Goffman, 1967, p. 115). Take a
party conversation: Not only are we expected to visi-
bly attend and emotionally respond to the other—we
also need to pull this off without it appearing bela-
bored. Outwardly spontaneous involvement in conver-
sation shows proper regard to the conversation partner,
the norms of conversation, and maintains our face as a
skilled conversationalist (Goffman, 1967, p. 114). Every
type of situation asks for striking a different involvement
depth: neither too distanced, nor too engrossed. Adults
in particular are “obliged to express a margin of disin-
volvement” (Goffman, 1967, p. 122).
And this leads us to interaction tension (Goffman,
1953, pp. 243–257, 1961, pp. 41–45). Whenever we in-
teract with others, our spontaneous involvement aligns
more or less well with the situation’s normative expec-
tations. If people’s spontaneous involvement aligns with
norms, people can allow themselves to stop reflexively
monitoring and controlling their involvement (Goffman,
1986, p. 378). The resultant positive experience is “eu-
phoric ease” (Goffman, 1961, p. 42). However, the sad
normal state of affairs is “dysphoric tension,” “some dis-
crepancy between obligatory involvements and spon-
taneous ones” (Goffman, 1961, p. 44). This leads par-
ticipants to experience “alienation from interaction”
(Goffman, 1967, p. 113): They feel bored, awkward, un-
easy. They have to effortfully fabricate an involvement
display that fits the situation against their inclinations,
and they are likely to become self-conscious about this
fabricated face, the thoughts and feelings of the other
participants, and whether the situation is ‘working.’ This
alienation is just as contagious as engrossment (Goffman,
1967, pp. 125–129).
Now just like flow theory suggests that the structure
of gaming activity affords flow, Goffman (1961, p. 43) ar-
gues that in gaming, “euphoric interaction is relatively of-
ten achieved: gaming is often fun.” This is because games
are purpose-designed to spontaneously excite and bind
deep joint involvement, and the situational norms of
gaming allow and demand just such deep joint involve-
ment. As a result, the existence of involvement norms
disappears from participants’ awareness. The paradox of
gameplay is that it is “shared, obligatory, spontaneous in-
volvement” (Goffman, 1961, p. 43).
In summary, Goffman provides an integrated model
of the social-psychological dynamics of social norms, at-
tention, and emotion in gameplay: When co-present
participants’ involvement is spontaneously excited and
bound by the situation’s sanctioned focal activity, they
reproduce and amplify each other’s involvement and
experience positive unselfconscious ease. When their
spontaneous involvement mismatches situational obli-
gations, they experience dysphoric tension and become
alienated from interaction (drifting with their atten-
tion, bored, self-conscious), which is likewise contagious,
while participants try to overtly display spontaneous in-
volvement in the legitimate focal activity.
3. Method
Clear as this model may be, it was developed from field
observations of mid-20th century Shetland Island com-
munities and US casinos. To explore its fit with contem-
porary video gaming, we conducted a focal re-analysis of
a larger data set of interviews with German adult video
game players on the social norms of gaming (reported in
Deterding, 2014).
Following Maxwell (2004), the original study devel-
oped an initial conceptual framework to structure data
collection and analysis. Specifically, it started from key
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dimensions of situational norms as theorized in frame
analysis (Goffman, 1986): settings, objects, roles, inter-
nal organization, metacommunication, attention, emo-
tion, rules for action and communication, and situational
boundaries. Because social norms are typically taken-for-
granted and therefore hard to elicit, the original study
used semi-structured episodic interviews (Flick, 1997)
to elicit a broad range of ‘critical incidents’ where par-
ticipants remembered a norm violation, which typically
makes norms consciously available. We then probed par-
ticipants to expand on the violated norm. Second, in-
spired by the grounded theory principle of constant com-
parison (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), the study intentionally
recruited participants who engaged in both ‘canonical’
leisurely gameplay and ‘atypical’ gameplay-as-work per-
formed by game journalists, game designers, game re-
searchers, and esports athletes. Participants were asked
to recall ‘typical’ kinds of leisurely gameplay situations
they engage in, to then compare these to the coun-
terpart in non-leisurely work-as-play, thus foreground-
ing norm differences. To ensure all our concepts were
grounded in data, the study followed the grounded the-
ory principles of constant comparison and theoretical
sampling (Corbin & Strauss, 2008): It gathered and coded
data in parallel, comparing each new datum against exist-
ing concepts, revising, dropping, or adding concepts as
required by the data, adapting interview script and par-
ticipants based on emerging questions until we reached
theoretical saturation.
All interviews were conducted in German with adult
nativeGerman-speaking participants acrossGermany be-
tweenMarch 2011 andMay 2012. Participants were pur-
posely sampled for diverse backgrounds in age, gender,
experience across game genres, devices, and social con-
textures. We conducted 19 interviews (about 1,900 min-
utes total recordings) until we reached saturation, in
line with prior findings (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006).
We transcribed recordings together with field notes and
coded them using the qualitative data analysis software
MAXQDA. This produced 3,241 coded segments across
181 initial codes, which resulted in 24 focused codes,
6 axial categories and the central theme of “gaming
modes.” This theme captured that we found no single
uniform set of norms for video gaming, but rather five
different sub-types of leisurely gaming and four differ-
ent sub-types of gaming-as-work, each with their own
internally coherent set of norms that would support the
sub-type’s purpose. E.g., we found a socializing gaming
mode whose norms where structured around experienc-
ing social connection, or a competitive mode around
achievement display before others, or an esports train-
ing mode structured around improving skill. As will be-
come apparent, involvement norms similarly varied with
gaming modes.
For the present article, we re-analyzed the data set
described above. Since Goffman (1961) identified in-
volvement as emotional and attentive engagement re-
sulting in unselfconscious engrossment, we started re-
analysis from 447 passages coded for ‘emotion norms,’
‘attention norms,’ and ‘tension/flow.’ ‘Attention norms’
and ‘emotion norms’ were predefined focused codes
that structured data generation, collection, and analy-
sis, and proved analytically distinct throughout the iter-
ative collection-coding-analysis process. The code ‘ten-
sion/flow’ emerged from the data as ‘experiences of self-
control and self-awareness,’ which we only later, dur-
ing write-up, formally connected to Goffman’s terms be-
cause of their mutual fit, inviting additional coding cycles
sensitized by the interaction tension model. As such, the
present study constitutes an instance of “double-fitting”
(Baldamus, 1972) between empirical material analysis
and conceptual framework, in which iteratively switch-
ing between the two mutually refines and differentiates
each one—a qualitative analysis approach characteristic
for Goffman’s own work (Williams, 1988).
Interview transcripts and field notes in the German
original as well as the code tree of the present study are
available at https://osf.io/3w4js. All data quoted below
is translated from the German original.
4. Results
4.1. Involvement Norms
4.1.1. Mandatory Spontaneous Involvement
Congruent with Goffman, we found a rich landscape of
norms regulating video gaming involvement. Maybe the
most basic norm of leisurely gaming voiced by partici-
pants is that one ought to spontaneously want to play:
Interviewer: Is there something you shouldn’t do dur-
ing playing?
P1: I don’t know, if you want to do something else,
then you should do something else. And if youwant to
play video games, then you should play a video game.
Enjoyment was seen as the legitimate official purpose of
leisurely gaming. While this was voiced as a mere expec-
tation in single-player gaming, it turns into a positive nor-
mative demand inmulti-player gaming, as satisfying gam-
ing was seen to depend on the others mustering some
minimum visible involvement: “People of course also
have to be there with a minimum stake, in wanting and
tactics…because otherwise the game collapses’’ (P3).
4.1.2. Social Interaction of Involvement
Four ways personal involvement affected the involve-
ment of others emerged. First, distracted players tend
to break the flow of gameplay and create boring pauses
bymissing their turn. Second, their inattentiveness leads
them to play sub-optimally, making either for a poor
teammate or boring opponent, as the following passage
nicely illustrates:
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P7: We played soccer, so we played Pro Evolution
Soccer 2012, with several friends, online, against each
other. So we were a two-player team in our living
room, and in Vienna friends of us were sitting, and
we played against them. And the one did indeed look
on hismobile phone from time to time, and then I told
him: ‘Hey, let that be! I don’twant to lose here, against
them.’ You’re quite captivated there, and—it was sim-
ilar when I once, with my friends, every two weeks
we play, we make a gaming night and play Golf to-
gether, Tiger Woods. And it’s annoying when people
don’t press ‘continue.’ That is, when they, like, talk
with each other or want to go have a smoke or some-
thing like that, so that’s, that impedes the game flow,
simply because you don’t get further.
Participants reported social contagion as a third way oth-
ers’ involvement affected their own. As one put it, in
solitary StarCraft play, they would just ‘breathe off’ ex-
citation, whereas in playing seated together with a team-
mate, expressing shared emotion would intensify it:
P10: When I play StarCraft alone at home and win,
then I also say ‘Puh’ [exhales]. But that way [playing
with their friend], you also work each other up a little.
That is because you, like, communicate so much with
each other and…also curse verbally somehow about
the enemy…and then after a, after a win, then you
alsomake a high five. So there the experience is some-
thing totally different.
Others’ verbal or bodily display of emotional involve-
ment amplifies and validates one’s own. Says an esports
athlete:
P15: Especially when you play on LAN…you rejoice
more, because you see your teammates, you can,
when he [got] something important, you can shake
him and say, like, ‘Great, man!’ But it’s just like that
when you see your team lose….Then all five [of the
team] sometimes sit like [makes depressed face] and
are just upset. And yes, the emotions are a bit higher.
Conversely, displaying continuous negative affect was
seen to ‘infect’ others’ mood. Asked whether they re-
membered an “inappropriate” way of playing, P2 named
“people who are simply in the mood for nothing. Who
document that [laughs] then, from ‘Ahhh, that’s stupid’
or, when it’s their turn, somehow are frustrated the
whole time.”
Fourth and finally, participants in a known or visibly
badmoodmade co-present others conscious about their
lacking enjoyment, which led co-present others to inhibit
their usual behavior. As P15 explains, “when a player
from my team…had just broken up with his girlfriend,
then [he is] a little down….When you notice that, [you]
shouldn’t taunt him on top of that.”
4.1.3. Involvement Display
As individual involvement depends on that of the oth-
ers, participants voiced a normative expectation to not
just experience but also display fitting involvement: “One
should show fun. So if you don’t connect to the game and
don’t enjoy it, one should still somehow show that it was
a nice situation to interact with friends” (P9).
These required displays were especially pronounced
around wins and losses:
P2: Yes, so in a group game, in a group game it is ex-
pected that you show elation when you have achieved
something, somehow….You should certainly also be ap-
propriately frustrated when something doesn’t work,
and not say: ‘Ahh, who cares.’ And then…in group situ-
ations like with the Kinect, there it’s certainly also the
case that you should appropriately be happy for some-
body else, if somebody made a new high score, be-
cause that’s certainly socially, like, desired.
Besides ‘working up’ appropriate involvement, partici-
pants also reported actively inhibiting felt emotions in or-
der to save face in the situation. As P5 noted on playing
multiplayer online shooters:
P5: So when I’m continually killed by the same
player, then you effectively develop such a kind of ha-
tred…that’s effectively also an admission that you are
inferior [pause]. But that I wouldn’t say [openly].
Interviewer: What kind of reaction do you show
instead?
P5: Nothing….There I completely contain myself.
Because that, that is, as I said, such a matter of honor.
That said, the social norms of leisurely gaming typically al-
low formore intense emotion expressions than everyday
conversation, because the gaming frame earmarks them
as ‘non-serious,’ not targeted at the actual biographical
person of the other. Says one participant:
P4: Anger, aggression, when you’re playing video
games together…those are all things accompanying
gameplay, that are often also playful….Nothing that
is wrong or so.
Interviewer: [D]o you remember a situation where
someone took that the wrong way?
P4: No, no, no. That’s with the people with whom I’ve
played up to now, so that they [pause] take that in
a way that shows me [that] they see that similarly.
Evaluate that in the same way, are apparently [pause]
socialized similarly, know that that’s part of gaming
and not meant in a malign manner, is even part of
the whole.
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In sum, participants described striking a precarious bal-
ance of disinvolved involvement—trying to win but
not ‘too much,’ visibly celebrating wins and bemoaning
losses, and yet not ‘really’ minding either. To fail at this
balance is to count as a “sore winner” or “sore loser.”
Either of which is problematic because it again spoils the
others’ involvement, as this participant explains:
P17: No, you are a sore loser if you, if you burden the
others with your own frustration. That means, when
you vent your anger…and you’re in a sour mood and
that becomes a burden for the others….I mean, that
you get angry when you lose, that’s alright. That’s nor-
mal….But when you then become annoying for the
others…then, then I find that a sore loser.
4.2. Attention Norms
4.2.1. Attentive Access
Fromhis field studies of casino gambling, Goffman (1986,
pp. 133–136) noted that players and bystanders are ex-
pected to limit their attentive access to certain legitimate
information streams and not access certain other, legit-
imately ‘hidden’ streams, such as the hand of another
Poker player. These attentive access norms were sup-
ported by material arrangements like removing mirrors
from the walls. We found similar norms and practices
in video gaming. As one interviewee described a multi-
player LAN party:
P5: Yes. Looking on the screen is taboo.
Interviewer: Ha. [That means?]
P5: [Yes, naturally] I mean, not, not on your own
screen, that’s obvious [laughs]. So of course you may
look on your own screen, but the tables are placed in
a way…that the screens always stood with their backs
to each other. So that you really only saw your friend
and could not look on the screen of the other person.
4.2.2. Attentive Focus and Depth
While participants concurred that some spontaneous in-
volvement was expected in any leisurely gaming, norms
starkly differed when it came to the expected focus and
depth of attention: what to attend to, and what forms of
distraction or interruption would be acceptable. These
norms seemed to functionally align with the legitimate
purpose of the situation. For instance, they differed with
the degree to which the game played would require
undivided attention. In a turn-based social game like
FarmVille, interruptions and distractions didn’t matter:
Interviewer: [I]s it okay to be interrupted with
FarmVille?
P12: Yes, most definitely. ‘Cause there’s nothing that
necessarily happens during that.
Compare this with a competitive real-time multi-player
game like StarCraft:
Interviewer: How would you have told whether one
of you was distracted or not?
P10: Well, [pause] actually already just somehow
looking away from the screen…turning my head to
you and talk. That would actually already be dis-
traction…because then for perhaps five seconds or
so I don’t see what’s happening there. What un-
der certain circumstances can already be decisive in
the game.
Normatively expected focus and depth of attention
also varied with gaming mode (Deterding, 2014). In
gaming modes valuing player peak performance—
hardcore, competitive, and esports tournament
gaming—participants reported strong and strongly en-
forced expectations to maintain intense unfailing atten-
tive focus on gameplay via the legitimate interface. In
social gaming, by contrast, such deep, exclusive game-
play focus was seen as inappropriate: Here, gameplay is
a means for social connection. Hence, participants are
expected to maintain attention of the others’ current
emotional states and engage in the legitimate main in-
volvement of conversation:
Interviewer: Is there something you have to do during
party gaming to play ‘correctly’?
P9: I believe [it is] to have enough of a distance from
the game and you’re still aware in what context the
whole thing takes place, namely in an amicable frame,
in, in a party frame. Tobe jolly andnot too focused and
fully focus on it and no communication happens, then
it really failed, I would say. Because it’s really about
getting to interact with each other, having fun, com-
municating, being able to laugh about it, being able to
laugh about yourself. I would say, if somebody would
fully shut himself off and focuses exclusively on it and
doesn’t interact with co-players, then I would say it
failed, yes.
Interviewer: Focus on what [exactly]?
P9: [On the] game, on the action. If somebody is com-
pletely in his own world and fully shut off and takes it
too over-ambitiously, I would say. Yes. I would say, the
way I play Battlefield, I really wouldn’t be fit for social
contact [laughs]. Yes.
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4.3. Conditions of Interaction Tension
4.3.1. Response-Present Others
Participants uniformly reported that response-present
others would make involvement norms salient and lead
them to manage their involvement display. Conversely,
being alone led them to not manage their displayed
involvement:
P9: So if I feel unobserved, in my private rooms, then
I can showany emotion, because therewould be noth-
ing inappropriate in doing so, because I wouldn’t of-
fend anyone with it. At most I would offend myself
[laughs].
This was voiced as one reason why multiplayer online
games would sometimes invite disinhibited display: The
game would not transmit bodily emotion display, and
even if players were to express e.g., anger over voice or
text chat, anonymity would save their face:
P19: So there [in online games] I let my emotions run
free. You can do that there, because you don’t speak
to the other. So you can’t directly hurt them. So you
also drop curse words…you would never say in the
face of a colleague.
4.3.2. Gaming versus Public Frames and Audiences
Notably, response-present others evoked different
norms depending on the type of frame and audience.
It is largely taken for granted but significant that most
leisurely gaming takes place within physically shielded
private places like a living room, either alone or sur-
roundedby co-players and an audiencewho are all aware
of and have at least implicitly assented to the fact that
the current situation is video gaming. This sets and li-
censes joint expectations around gaming-typical involve-
ment and makes displayed behavior intelligible. As one
player noted, when he played StarCraft online on his
laptop communicating with his team members via Voice
over Internet Protocol in his mother’s kitchen, he would
feel embarrassment when his mother entered the room,
who did not know the game:
P10: If somebody, somebodywho has now clue about,
no view of the game and hears me talking. So that’s
somehow awkward for me, because somebody who
doesn’t know what I’m doing just hears these weird,
cryptic communicative lumps of language from me.
This issue becomes even more salient in non-gaming en-
counters. In “public traffic” like bus stops, markets, or
trams, norms demand adults to pay and draw minimal
overt attention (Goffman, 1963). In public, players are
exposed to an unknown audience that may not under-
stand nor approve of ‘gaming.’ Hence, participants stated
that they would strongly inhibit their involvement dis-
plays in public:
Interviewer: If you play amobile game…in comparison
to playing at home alone…is there a difference inwhat
emotions you can or are allowed to express?
P7: Since I am then mostly in a public surrounding,
loud screaming or throwing that thing in the corner
are not an option. Although you would really want to
do it, you have to restrain yourself a bit there and, let’s
put it this way, appear a bit more suited for public.
Similarly, a participant reported that during her work
hours as a game designer at the office, although playing
a game was part of her official professional duties, she
would fit her emotion display to the office frame:
P9: Because I am sitting with two other colleagues in
the office. And there, a certain behavior codex is de-
sired. I don’t want my colleagues to [see me] curse
loudly or bangmy hand on the table [which shewould
do playing at home]. A certain body posture is simply
proper. So I can’t just let myself slump in the chair
in front of the computer, as it sometimes happens
at home, when I relax. Instead I’m sitting upright and
straight and really try [laughing] tomake an interested
impression. And yes, that’s a different composure to-
ward the game.
4.3.3. Solitary Dysphoric Tension
Interestingly, our data showed that involvement norms
could also become salient and cause dysphoric tension
during solitary play. We mainly observed this during
work-at-play. Participants would experience a sponta-
neous pull to let themselves become unselfconsciously
involved in gaming, but their current work frame made
salient that they ought to engage with the game in a dis-
engaged, analytic fashion, e.g., to analyze it as a game
designer or review it as a game journalist. As one game
journalist described his experience:
P1: So I really think that [pause] that when I’m play-
ing reviewingly…that I am somehow taking part cog-
nitively in a different way. That means, beforehand
I’m already in this mood: ‘Okay, I do, I work now, and
I try to grasp intellectually what is going on here now.’
And in a normal non-reviewing gaming situation ex-
actly that is a great advantage for me, that I don’t
try to grasp things intellectually, but instead let my-
self be drifted by the sensual impressions, and that
can of course emotionally evoke very different things,
yes? For instance, at the end of Metal Gear Solid 4
I cried like a baby, because it was a completely differ-
ent situation than for Peter, who, he wasn’t yet with
the game magazine then, but he reviewed the game
back then. [O]f course I have to capture these emo-
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tions, but I can’t give myself so fully into them that
over that I forget to bring that into words.
4.4. Experiences of Interaction Tension
The previous quote nicely highlights the major experi-
ential quality participants reported with regard to inter-
action tension. Goffman (1961) suggested that high or
dysphoric interaction tension was characterized by at-
tentive drift, boredom, and awkward self-consciousness,
and low tension or euphoric ease by unselfconscious
attentive and emotional absorption. Interestingly, our
data showed little awkward self-consciousness associ-
ated with dysphoric tension. Boredom was more fre-
quently reported, when social or professional norms de-
manded that one continued to play despite a lack of
spontaneous interest: “The thing that you play with peo-
ple in coop [cooperative mode], and you don’t want to
anymore, and another person still wants to” (P3). Far
more salient for dysphoric tension was the experience of
unpleasant, effortful self-control, be it to force continued
attention on the activity, inhibit emotional responses, or
maintain analytic distance. Playing for work, for instance,
a game journalist stated that “[I]must not letmyself drift”
(P1), emotions “are more inhibited, so…the game expe-
rience is markedly more inhibited at the office, because
I cannot let myself go” (P9, a game designer), and “if that
is necessary, that I play every day, even if I don’t want to,
then I forcemyself to do it” (P13, esports athlete). All this
resulted in an overall more muted, distanced, and less
emotionally intense experience, “less ambitious, more
passive” (P9).
Descriptions of euphoric ease interestingly align
strongly with flow theory, down to the very words peo-
ple use for it:
P3: You notice it when you don’t notice anything any-
more…when the state of unselfconsciousness sets in
and you get into this flow…certain emotions [pause]
come up in…a more pure form. That is, when you
let yourself fall or something, and simply savor that,
then it may be that you…certain things are simply
more intense.
“Letting yourself go” or “letting yourself fall” were fre-
quent turns of phrase for moments of low interaction
tension, especially in solitary gaming, indicating that
again, self-control is a crucial experiential dimension of
interaction tension.
5. Discussions and Conclusion
5.1. Main Findings
Our data broadly supports Goffman’s interaction tension
model for contemporary video gaming. First, we indeed
found a nuanced set of social involvement norms. In
leisurely gaming, gameplay ought to be spontaneously
involving, and players ought to display a delicate bal-
ance of disinvolved involvement to optimally support
mutual involvement: showing investment in winning to
make the others’ investment feel justified, yet not be-
coming so over-involved as to overlook the other’s feel-
ings or burden themwith one’s frustration. Players ought
to limit their attention to legitimate information chan-
nels. And they ought to maintain an attentive focus
and depth matching the functional requirements of the
game and the situation’s official purpose (e.g., socializ-
ing versus competing). Thus, we found that involvement
norms are modulated by gaming modes, games, audi-
ences, and settings, which Goffman did not suggest. Also,
while response-present others made involvement norms
salient, people reported dysphoric tension even in soli-
tary play, namely when internalized professional norms
demanded analytic detachmentwhile the game afforded
unselfconscious engrossment.
Second, we observed several social involvement
dynamics. Yet where Goffman only identified self-
consciousness dynamics, we observed additional dynam-
ics of emotion contagion through emotion display, and
distraction leading players to create undesired breaks in
gameplay, or playing suboptimally.
Third and finally, as suggested by Goffman, we found
that low interaction tension was experienced positively,
and high tension negatively. Here, our data qualifies
Goffman’s claim that dysphoric tension chiefly revolves
around boredom and self-consciousness: For our partici-
pants, effortful self-control of attention and emotion and
a consequential dampening of emotional intensity was
far more pronounced and negatively valued. Meanwhile,
their reports of euphoric ease aligned closely with flow
states, which brings us back to the beginning.
5.2. Contextualisation
We opened this article with the question of how video
games absorb our attention and why we find such ab-
sorption desirable. Flow theory answers that cognitively
and physically demanding activities absorb attention,
which affords positively valenced order in consciousness
and blocks attention-wandering to negatively valenced
worries and self-conscious concerns (Csikszentmihalyi,
1990). Bowman (2018b) and others have suggested ex-
tending such analyses from physical and cognitive to
emotional and social demands. So,what does interaction
tension, as we found it in contemporary video gaming,
add to this debate?
For one, it contributes a genuine social-psychological
construct for social demands. FollowingGoffman,we can
specify one kind of social demands of gaming as social in-
volvement demands or the norms for ‘appropriate’ gam-
ing involvement. There are certainly many other kinds of
social demands in gameplay, but these appear conceptu-
ally and mechanistically distinct.
Notably, second, this kind of social demand is not
a separable ‘add-on’ to cognitive (including attentive)
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and emotional demands, as suggested by Peña (2018) or
Bowman (2018a): they pre-structure and co-constitute
them. There are social demands on attention (cognition)
and emotion, in presence and absence alike: The ab-
sence of salient social demands in solitary play is just
as impactful as their presence in multiplayer encoun-
ters. Furthermore, social demands are not exhausted by
what is triggered by a game or even other co-present
players: They also always already arise from internalized
norms about gaming and the gaming mode in question,
as instances of interaction tension in solitary professional
play demonstrated. Put differently, the emotional and at-
tentive demands of video games arise at the intersection
of material features, subjective dispositions, and social
contextures (Elson, Breuer, & Quandt, 2014). Interaction
tension captures exactly this kind of higher-level dynamic
or relational phenomenon.
It concurs with flow and mood management the-
ory that activities that spontaneously afford involvement
block worry and self-consciousness, but adds a crucial
social-psychological loop: To be flow-affording or inter-
vening, activities need to align not just with players’ sub-
jective dispositions (e.g., matching game challenge and
player skill), but also with the social norms of the sur-
rounding situation. Misalignment not only affords bore-
dom or self-consciousness: Often, social norms will com-
pel players to engage in effortful self-control (Baumeister,
Vohs, & Tice, 2007) to align overt behavior with norms,
and that is negatively valenced. Bopp et al. (2018) found
that players sometimes needed to actively self-regulate
intense negative emotions to ‘function’ in-game or out-
of-game. Eudaimonic media research posits that peo-
ple sometimes willingly self-control to engage with de-
manding media that promise personal growth (Eden et
al., 2018). Our findings suggest that media-related self-
control is not just a practical matter of functioning or
a price worth paying for personal growth: People dis-
like the strain of self-control involved in fitting displayed
involvement into social norms. Therefore, they actively
seek out or create media reception situations in which
spontaneously afforded and socially demanded involve-
ment align, such as watching a ‘tearjerker’ home alone
or in the anonymity of a darkened movie theatre, where
crying in public is both accepted and unnoticed.
5.3. Limitations
The qualitative nature and small, culturally, and tempo-
rally homogeneous sample of the present study limits
its generalizability. We also note that the present ar-
ticle reports a re-analysis of qualitative data from an
original study with a different focal theme (Deterding,
2014). While said original study stopped data collection
on reaching theoretical saturation, the codes and themes
of the present study are not necessarily fully theoreti-
cally saturated.
5.4. Outlook
A next step is to perform quantitative studies across di-
vergent contexts to test the relations proposed in in-
teraction tension. Should these bear out, interaction
tension is arguably only the first opening of the social-
psychological dynamics of gameplay. For instance, the
model fits and identifies a potential systematic place
for other important social-psychological phenomena and
mechanisms like social emotions (Turner & Stets, 2006),
joint attention (Seeman, 2011), emotional contagion
(Hatfield et al., 1994), or collective emotions (von Scheve
& Salmela, 2014) within video gaming. The literature
on these phenomena specifies, but also qualifies and at
times goes beyond the relations captured by Goffman—
just as the social norms of gaming include but exceed in-
volvement and its display.
Acknowledgments
This work was conducted in the Digital Creativity
Labs (digitalcreativity.ac.uk), jointly funded by EPSRC/
AHRC/InnovateUK under grant No. EP/M023265/1.
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
References
Baldamus, W. (1972). The role of discoveries in social sci-
ence. In T. Shanin (Ed.), The rules of the game: Cross-
disciplinary essays onmodels in scholarly thought (pp.
276–302). London: Tavistock Publications.
Bartsch, A., & Hartmann, T. (2017). The role of cognitive
and affective challenge in entertainment experience.
Communication Research, 44(1), 29–53. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0093650214565921
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., & Tice, D. M. (2007). The
strength model of self-control. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 16(6), 351–355.
Bopp, J. A., Opwis, K., & Mekler, E. D. (2018). “An
odd kind of pleasure”: Differentiating emotional chal-
lenge in digital games. In Proceedings of the 2018
CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Sys-
tems. New York, NY: ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/
3173574.3173615
Bowman, N. D. (2018a). The demanding nature of video
game play. In N. Bowman (Ed.), Video games: A
medium that demands our attention (pp. 1–23). New
York, NY: Routledge.
Bowman, N. D. (Ed.). (2018b). Video games: A
medium that demands our attention. New York,
NY: Routledge.
Bowman, N. D., & Tamborini, R. (2015). “In the mood
to game”: Selective exposure and mood manage-
ment processes in computer game play. New Media
& Society, 17(3), 375–374. https://doi.org/10.1177/
Media and Communication, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 226–236 234
1461444813504274
Bowman, N. D., Wasserman, J., & Banks, J. (2018). Devel-
opment of the video game demand scale. In N. Bow-
man (Ed.), Video games: Amedium that demands our
attention (pp. 207–232). New York, NY: Routledge.
Burghardt, G. M. (2005). The genesis of animal play: Test-
ing the limits. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cairns, P., Cox, A., & Nordin, A. I. (2014). Immersion in
digital games: Review of gaming experience research.
In M. C. Angelides & H. Agius (Eds.), Handbook of dig-
ital games (pp. 337–361). Hoboken, NJ: JohnWiley &
Sons.
Calleja, G. (2011). In-game: From immersion to incorpo-
ration. Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press.
Cole, T., Cairns, P., & Gillies, M. (2015). Emotional and
functional challenge in core and avant-garde games.
In Companian Proceedings of the 2015 Annual Sym-
posium on Computer–Human Interaction in Play (pp.
121–126). New York, NY: ACM. https://doi.org/10.
1145/2793107.2793147
Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. L. (2008). Basics of qualitative
research: Techniques and procedures for developing
grounded theory (3rd ed.). Los Angeles, CA, London,
New Delhi, and Singapore: Sage.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The psychology of op-
timal experience. New York, NY: Harper and Row.
Demand. (n.d.). In Oxford English Dictionary. Retrieved
from https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/49580
Denisova, A., Guckelsberger, C., & Zendle, D. (2017). Chal-
lenge in digital games: Towards developing a mea-
surement tool. In Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Confer-
ence Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Com-
puting Systems (pp. 2511–2519). New York, NY: ACM.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3027063.3053209
Deterding, S. (2014). Modes of play: A frame analytic
account of video game play (Unpublished Doctoral
dissertation). Hamburg University, Hamburg, Ger-
many. Retrieved from http://ediss.sub.uni-hamburg.
de/volltexte/2014/6863
Eden, A., Johnson, B. K., & Hartmann, T. (2018). En-
tertainment as a creature comfort: Self-control and
selection of challenging media. Media Psychology,
21(3), 352–376. https://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.
2017.1345640
Elson, M., Breuer, J., & Quandt, T. (2014). Know thy
player: An integrated model of player experience for
digital games research. In M. C. Angelides & H. Ag-
ius (Eds.), Handbook of digital games (pp. 362–387).
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
Flick, U. (1997). The episodic interview: Small-scale nar-
ratives as approach to relevant experiences. London:
LSE Methodology Institute.
Goffman, E. (1953). Communication conduct in an island
community. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
Goffman, E. (1961). Encounters: Two studies in the soci-
ology of interaction. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
Goffman, E. (1963). Behavior in public places: Notes on
the social organization of gatherings. New York, NY:
The Free Press.
Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-
face behavior. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.
Goffman, E. (1983). The interaction order. American So-
ciological Review, 48(1), 1–17.
Goffman, E. (1986). Frame analysis: An essay on the or-
ganization of experience. Boston, MA: Northeastern
University Press.
Guest, G., Bunce, A., & Johnson, L. (2006). How many in-
terviews are enough? An experiment with data sat-
uration and variability. Field Methods, 18(1), 59–82.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1525822X05279903
Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Rapson, R. L. (1994). Emo-
tional contagion. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Henricks, T. S. (2015). Play and the human condition.
Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Hung, A. C. Y. (2011). The work of play: Meaning-making
in video games. New York, NY: Peter Lang.
Maxwell, J. A. (2004). Qualitative research design: An
interactive approach (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Pellegrini, A. D. (2009). The role of play in human devel-
opment. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Peña, J. (2018). A communication model of the social de-
mands in video games. In N. Bowman (Ed.), Video
games: A medium that demands our attention (pp.
125–144). New York, NY: Routledge.
Reinecke, L. (2016). Mood management theory. In P.
Rössler, C. A. Hoffner, & L. van Zoonen (Eds.), The in-
ternational encyclopedia of media effects (pp. 1–13).
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. https://doi.org/10.
1002/9781118783764.wbieme0085
Scheff, T. J. (2000). Shame and the social bond: A socio-
logical theory. Sociological Theory, 18(1), 84–99.
Seeman, A. (Ed.). (2011). Joint attention: New develop-
ments in psychology, philosophy of mind, and social
neuroscience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sniderman, S. (1999). Unwritten rules. The Life of Games.
Retrieved from http://www.gamepuzzles.com/tlog/
tlog2.htm
Stenros, J. (2015). Playfulness, play, and games: A con-
structionist ludology approach. Tampere: Tampere
University Press.
Sweetser, P., & Wyeth, P. (2005). GameFlow: A model
for evaluating player enjoyment in games. Comput-
ers in Entertainment, 3(3). https://doi.org/10.1145/
1077246.1077253
Taylor, T. L. (2009). The assemblage of play. Games
and Culture, 4(4), 331–339. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1555412009343576
Turner, J. H., & Stets, J. E. (2006). Sociological theo-
ries of human emotions. Annual Review of Sociol-
ogy, 32(1), 25–52. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.
soc.32.061604.123130
von Scheve, C., & Salmela, M. (Eds.). (2014). Collective
emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, R. (1988). Understanding Goffman’s methods.
Media and Communication, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 226–236 235
In P. Drew & A. Wootton (Eds.), Erving Goffman: Ex-
ploring the interaction order (pp. 64–88). Cambridge
and Oxford: Polity Press.
About the Author
Sebastian Deterding is a Researcher/Designer working on wellbeing-driven experience design. He is
a Reader at the Digital Creativity Labs at the University of York, Founder and Director of the design
agency Coding Conduct, and Co-Editor of The Gameful World: Approaches, Issues, Applications (MIT
Press, 2015), and Role-Playing Game Studies: Transmedia Foundations (Routledge, 2018).
Media and Communication, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 226–236 236
